Chief Justice French objected and stated that the idea that Flight Centre and the airlines were competing “adopts a notion of competition within the meaning of the law, which is in relation to that of an agency relationship”. He focused on the legal concept of the agency, citing the maxim “He who acts by another does it himself.” He acknowledged that the term “agent” in trade and commerce is not a legal representative, but that it is not a broader trade agent, but a legal agent in the case of Flight Centre – Flight Centre. Chief Justice French stated that the relevant activity in this case, the sale of contractual rights on travel on airlines, was in the “heart” of the agreement of the agency in question. The Presiding Witness concluded his disagreement by concluding that “with respect to the provision of contractual rights, Flight Centre`s conduct must properly be regarded as that of the airline.” 15.2.1 All definitions suffer from imperfections, but freedom of choice is essentially defined as the relationship that is created when a person known as an agent acts for another, acting in terms of a client. The actions of the agent allow the adjudicator power and a third party to be put in a contractual relationship (sometimes unauthorized). The agent may also be allowed to transfer ownership of the client to a third party. In general, the agent`s actions have such an effect, since the adjudicating entity authorized the agent to perform the acts in question and the agent gave its consent. The agent becomes in a way an extension of the client and is therefore able to change the legal status of the client, either by binding it to a contract or by making a compulsory transfer of the client`s assets (and, sometimes, by making the principal liable). Justices Keifel and Gageler ruled that, despite The fact that Flight Centre was acting as an agent for the airlines, it was free to advance its own interests over those of the airlines, to set their own ticket prices and to decide whether tickets were sold or not. To the extent that the agent is free to act and act in his own interest, they stated that “the mere existence of the agency relationship did not legally prevent the agent from competing with the client for the provision of contractual rights against the client.” In a separate case, Gordon J.A. added that Flight Centre had, in itself, demonstrated competing conduct, without referring to the interests of the airlines, by acting as a competitor, not as an intermediary, but as a competitor. With regard to trade relations, there is a legal presumption in Singapore that the parties intend to be legally bound when entering into agreements.

Only a clear statement that the parties did not want to be legally connected would overturn this presumption. The opposite is true for social relations, where a clear statement is needed on the intention to be legally bound. 15.1.1 Agency law plays an important role in trade, particularly with the emergence of modern enterprise, which is described as personal by legal fiction and can carry out its own operations. As a company is not a real person, it must act by man. Even with individuals, it will often be easier to act on others, especially if the transaction is technical or professional in nature. As a result, much of the day-to-day commercial implementation is facilitated by intermediaries acting within the framework of the authority delegated to them, whether explicit or implicit. Persons acting on behalf of others with such power are considered agents, and the legal effect of such acts, through an agent, is that the person for whom they act – the principal obligatory – may be bound to such acts and be bound by legal obligations to the third party who is dealing with the agents.